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ABSTRACT
Many of the decision-making tasks involve gambling and gambling paradigms
and therefore it is important to understand how gambling relates to decision-making,
especially in individuals who use substances. The goal of this study was to investigate
how individuals with SUD will perform on a slot machine and relate the slot-machine
performance to current lab measures of decision-making. Individuals with and without
substance use disorders gambled on a slot machine and completed other decision-making
tasks (e.g., IGT, BART, delay discounting). Rewards were manipulated in terms of
magnitude (real monetary payout verses no payout) for two reasons. Gambling
performance was compared to three common lab measures of decision-making (i.e., IGT,
BART, & delay discounting). In addition, measures of substance use and gambling
motivation were obtained to relate the slot-machine paradigm to meaningful reasons for
engaging in addictive behaviors. There were four main findings in this study. First, all
participants tended to bet more tokens per trial on the slot machine when there was no
monetary compensation compared to if there was. Second, no group or magnitude
differences were found on any of the decision-making tasks (i.e., IGT, BART, and delay
discounting). Third, the slot machine and all the decision-making task seems to be
relatively independent from each other. Fourth, performance on the slot machine and the
decision-making tasks was able to predict using alcohol for positive reinforcement, in
particular, for social situations and enhancing positive feelings and experiences. It is
important that future research investigates decision making 1) uses multiple measures of
ix

decision making to access potentially different aspect of decision-making and 2) flesh out
the differences between these tasks and find out what these tasks are able to detect.

x

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Decision-Making in Substance Use Disorders
Individuals with substance use disorders (SUD) tend to make poor decisions
(Bechara, 2003). For example, individuals with SUD repeatedly take drugs despite longterm negative consequences. Decision-making was not always thought to be important in
studying addiction (Bechara, 2003), but research is increasingly suggesting that decisionmaking is a crucial construct for understanding the mechanism involved in addictive
behavior (Bechara, 2003; Bechara et al., 2001; Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, & Pedulla,
2003; Lejuez et al., 2003). A plethora of research has suggested that individuals with
SUD perform poorly compared to controls on decision-making tasks, often failing to
learn to adjust their choices over time (Bechara, 2003; Leeman & Potenza, 2012). Three
commonly used tasks in the substance use literature are the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT),
the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), and delay discounting (Bechara, Damasio,
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Kirby & Maraković, 1996; Lejuez et al., 2002). All of
these tasks tap different aspects of decision-making and play a crucial role in how the
decision-making process is understood in SUD. Many of the tasks noted above
investigate decision-making under risky and ambiguous circumstances. The deficits seen
in SUD come in circumstances where there is not a clear “right” decision. Some
decisions will yield reward now and others later, or they will be able to help the
individual avoid a potential consequence.
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Decision-making is still poorly understood in SUD, and the results of studies are
often conflicting (Leeman & Potenza, 2012). Some studies find that individuals with
SUD perform worse on measures of decision-making and other studies find no
differences between SUD participants and controls (See Leeman & Potenza, 2012, for a
partial review). Many reasons could be accounting for these discrepancies. For example,
decision-making is often measured with tasks that involve gambling paradigms (Bechara,
Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996; Lejuez et al., 2002). Using gambling paradigms to
measure decision-making may be problematic as many individuals with SUD may also
have comorbid gambling problems (Petry, Stinson, & Grant, 2005). This potential
confound makes it difficult to untangle the role gambling plays in decision-making for
individuals with SUD. Little research has investigated substance users performance
when gambling, such as a on a slot machine. Researching performance on a slot machine
may be very relevant, as poor performance could indicate that gambling behavior plays a
substantial role in decision-making in SUD. Gambling performance could also be related
to measures of decision-making to see how similar or different these tasks are and used to
try and predict outcome measure, such as substance-use severity. Comparing gambling
to commonly used measures of decision-making may shed some light on if these
constructs are related and if so how. The goal of this study was to investigate how
individuals with SUD would perform on a slot machine and relate the slot-machine
performance to current lab measures of decision-making.
Gambling and Decision-Making Paradigms
Slot Machines
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Many decision-making tasks used in research are based on real-world gambling
paradigms. Gambling is often defined as giving up something in the hopes of gaining
something with greater value (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). When
gambling, an individual is faced with making decisions under risk, uncertainty, and
ambiguity. Gambling is similar to many decision-making paradigms in research;
however, unlike these tasks, in real-world gambling these choices are often for real
money and can carry very severe consequences. Due to a plethora of research showing
the similarities between gambling and substance use, pathological gambling has been
reclassified as an addictive disorder in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association,
2013). Pathological gambling was also renamed gambling disorder in the DSM-5. The
term gambling disorder will be used in this paper to reflect this update. Individuals with
gambling disorder show similar decision-making deficits and other behaviors similar to
substance users (Leeman & Potenza, 2012). Both disorders are characterized by
tolerance, withdrawal, repeated attempts to stop, and continued engagement despite longterm negative consequences (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The spectrum of
shared clinical and biological features has led to the reclassification of pathological
gambling from a disorder of impulse-control to a behavioral addiction in the DSM-5. In
addition, SUD and pathological gambling are highly comorbid (Petry, Stinson, & Grant,
2005). Compared to controls, individuals with pathological gambling are five to seven
times more likely to have alcohol, nicotine, or substance dependence (Petry et al., 2005).
Despite the immense amount of similarities between gambling disorder and SUD,
there has been little empirical research on gambling. Not investigating gambling
behaviors could be a potential confounding factor when using these gambling-paradigms
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as a measure of decision-making in substance users. Precautions should be taken to fully
understand the individuals’ gambling history in order to accurately judge the performance
on these tasks.
Previous research has compared individuals’ performance on slot machines.
Many studies have attempted to find reasons why people may gamble more or less
(Chóliz, 2010; Coates & Blaszczynski, n.d.; Dixon, Harrigan, Sandhu, Collins, &
Fugelsang, 2010; Dixon, MacLaren, Jarick, Fugelsang, & Harrigan, in press; Dixon,
Nastally, Jackson, & Habib, 2009; Weatherly, McDougall, & Gillis, 2006; Weatherly,
Thompson, Hodny, & Meier, 2009). For example, one factor that affects gambling is the
payback percentage, which is the rate of payoff for the game. A 97% playback
percentage would mean that for every dollar the slot machine takes in it will dispense, on
average, 97 cents back. Gillis, McDonald, and Weatherly (2008) found that increasing
the payback percentage can increase the frequency of betting while playing on a
simulated slot machine. However, to see this effect, the difference in playback
percentage had to be quite large (105% versus 85%). In contrast, Haw (2008) was not
able to detect that participants could tell a meaningful change between different payout
schedules unless the participant received a lot of reinforcement.
Very little research has investigated the effects of drugs and alcohol on slot
machine performance. Whitton and Weatherly (2009) investigated performance on both
a simulated slot machine and video poker amongst American Indians and non-American
Indians after alcohol consumption. They found a weak interaction between ethnicity and
alcohol on the number of credits bet but failed to find a significant simple effect. The
sample size in this study was quite low (i.e., 12 in each group) and a larger sample size
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could have led to more robust results. Also, the study attempted to investigate how
alcohol intoxication would affect performance on a slot machine and they did not
investigate whether or not having problematic alcoholic use affected performance.
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is one of, if not the most, widely used assessment
for decision-making in both research (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994;
Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996; Brevers, Bechara, Cleeremans, & Noël,
2013), and, more recently, clinical use (Buelow & Suhr, 2009; Lin, Song, Chen, Lee, &
Chiu, 2013). In the IGT, an individual must select a card from one of four decks (Deck
A, B, C, or D). Every time that the individual selects a card, he/she will win some
amount of hypothetical money as well as possibly receive some sort of monetary
punishment. The overall goal of the task is to win as much money as possible. The
rewards for each deck remain the same, but the punishers will vary among the different
cards in each deck, ranging from the loss of no money to losing a very large amount of
money. Each deck has a different payout schedule. In Decks A and C, the losses are of
small magnitude, but very frequent, and in Decks B and D the losses are infrequent, but
of a much larger magnitude. If the individual continuously selects cards from deck C or
D, over time he/she will win hypothetical money, which is in contrast to if the individual
continuously chooses from deck A or B, in which case he/she will lose money over time.
The individual gets to choose 100 cards, and starts the game with a hypothetical
$2000. In order to maximize the amount of money won on the task, the individual must
learn, over time, to select cards from the decks with better payout schedules or “good”
decks (i.e., C & D), and stop selecting cards from the decks with poorer payout schedules
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or “bad” decks (i.e., A & B). Many individuals with certain disorders, such as SUD, fail
to learn to adjust their choices over time and will continue to select cards from the “bad”
decks despite losing hypothetical money over time (Bechara et al., 2001).
The IGT has been shown to be sensitive to at least 13 different disorders,
including addictive disorders such as SUD and gambling disorders (Lin et al., 2013).
However, many variations and different ways of administering the task has made the
research and clinical utility of the task difficult to ascertain (Fernie & Tunney, 2006).
For example, Fernie and Tunney (2006) found that altering the task instructions by
adding a hint about reinforcer types improved performance. Also important to note is the
“Deck B Phenomenon” where even “normal decision-makers” often prefer to select cards
from deck B, which over time results in a net loss and must be taken into consideration
when interpreting the task (Lin et al., 2013). Despite these limitations, the IGT has
remained a staple task when measuring decision-making and has many useful
applications (Buelow & Suhr, 2009).
There are many reasons why using the IGT is useful for investigating decisionmaking, especially in individuals with SUD. The complex nature of the task makes it
difficult to learn the payout schedules for each of the decks. The result of this complex
payout schedule is that the individual needs to make risky choices under ambiguous
circumstances. Making choices under ambiguous situations has been shown to mimic
real world decision-making (Platt & Huettel, 2008), which greatly improves the utility of
the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994). The IGT has helped flesh out making decisions under
different circumstances (Brevers et al., 2013). For example, the IGT has helped
demonstrate that ambiguity is particularly important in decision-making in addiction
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(Brevers et al., 2012). Brevers et al. (2012) found that poor decision-making in problem
gambling was related to tasks of ambiguity (i.e., IGT), but not decision-making under
only risky circumstances (i.e., coin-flipping task). This result suggests that different
aspects of decision-making need to be taken into consideration when investigating
different addictive disorders.
Studies like the one by Brevers et al. (2012) show the importance of using the
IGT in addiction because deficits in decision-making under ambiguity are particularly
salient in this population. The IGT has also been useful for assessing for individual
differences in decision-making (Harman, 2011; Suhr & Tsanadis, 2007). For example,
Harmon (2011) showed that individuals with little interest in thinking performed worse
on the IGT than those with a greater interest in thinking as measured by a Need-forCognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984). Suhr and Tsnadis (2007) found
that poor performance on the IGT was related to elevated fun-seeking personality using
the Behavioral Inhibition/Activation Scales (Carver & White, 1994). Finally, the IGT is
widely used and well known, making it useful to compare results across many different
studies. All of these studies help demonstrate the utility of the IGT in investigating
decision-making.
Failure to learn to adjust choices over time on the IGT has become a hallmark
sign of problems with ventral medial prefrontal cortex, or what will be referred to in this
paper as orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Fellows, 2007). Bechara et al. (1994) created the
IGT to help assess for OFC damage by mimicking real-world decision-making. They
found that individuals with OFC damage performed poorly compared to controls and
failed to learn to adjust their choices over time (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara et al.,
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1996). This finding became important for individuals with SUD because metabolic
abnormalities had been seen in the OFC in individuals with SUD, but this abnormality
was largely overlooked in terms of addiction at first (Bechara, 2003). Later, Bechara’s
group found individuals with OFC damage showed similar behaviors to individuals with
SUD, such as having poor insight (being unaware of the problem) and choosing
immediate rewards while ignoring any potential consequences (Bechara, 2003). Bechara
used the IGT to compare individuals with SUD, controls, and individuals with OFC
damage (Bechara et al., 2001). They found that substance users performed poorly
compared to controls and that twice as many individuals with SUD compared to controls
(61% versus 32.5%) showed deficits similar to individuals with OFC damage (Bechara et
al., 2001). Performance on the task also directly correlated with aspects of substance use
(i.e., abstinence, years of abuse, relapses, and the ability to hold meaningful employment;
Bechara et al., 2001). These studies from Bechara’s lab started to show several important
things: the OFC plays a crucial role in role in decision-making, deficits seen in the IGT
can be directly related to substance use, and that investigating decision-making is crucial
for understanding addiction.
The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART)
Another important task that has helped researchers understand decision-making is
the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002). In the original task,
individuals are serially presented with 90 balloons. The individual decides whether
he/she will pump air into the balloon or not. Every time that he/she decides to pump air
into the balloon, he/she collects a small amount of money (usually 1 or 5 cents per
pump). However, at some point the balloon will pop. If the balloon pops, then the
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individual loses all of the money that he/she earned on that balloon. Instead of deciding
to pump more air into the balloon, the individual can choose to collect all of the money
earned for that balloon, and then proceed to the next balloon. In this way, the individual
must try to learn how much air he/she can pump each balloon up with before the balloon
pops, so as to maximize gain. The goal of the task is to make as much money as possible.
There are three different colors of balloons. Orange balloons pop, on average,
after eight pumps, yellow balloons after 16 pumps, and blue balloons pop after 64 pumps.
For the first part of the task, the colored balloons are presented in a random order. In the
second half, the individual is presented with 15 orange balloons, then 15 yellow balloons,
and finally 15 blue balloons, in that order. A later version of this task discarded the
colored balloons. Instead only 30 balloons are presented with an average threshold of 64
pumps before they pop. The task is analyzed by taking the average number of pumps
from all the balloons that did not pop (Lejuez et al., 2002). This dependent variable
excludes the balloons that pop because it is not known how much further the person
would have pumped up the balloon if he/she had been able to. Other variables that can be
investigated include the total number of balloons popped, money earned and the interpump interval (how fast the individual was pumping up the balloons; Lejuez et al., 2002).
The BART, alongside the IGT, is another way to measure decision-making under
risky and ambiguous circumstances. Lejeuz et al. (2003) showed that the task can
differentiate smokers from non-smokers. In fact, using a logistic regression, they showed
that the BART can differentiate smokers and non-smokers better than the IGT. The task
has also been used in children, generally showing greater risk-taking in adolescents with
substance use or conduct problems than controls (Crowley, et al., 2010; Crowley, et al.,
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2006; Lejuez, et al., 2003). In addition, BART has shown adequate validity as a measure
of risk-taking using genetic markers (Hopko et al., 2006) as well as good temporal
stability (rtt>0.70; White, Lejuez, & de Wit, 2008).
Unfortunately, overall results have varied using the BART. The BART may not
be incredibly sensitive to decision-making deficits in all substance-using populations,
though in general, substance users will pump more air into each balloon than controls
indicating higher risk taking (Leeman & Potenza, 2012). The discrepancies in the
research could be due to the many different versions of this task and different substance
using populations tested. For example, Crowley et al. (2006) found that adolescent boys
with substance-use problems took greater risks on the BART compared to controls, but
this finding was not replicated using the same version of the task in adults with
substance-use problems (Thompson et al., 2012). In some versions of the task, the
individual may get paid one or five cents per pump of air into the balloon. This
difference in payment could be very significant as magnitude of reward and punisher has
been shown to be sensitive in substance users (Thompson et al., 2012). Future research
will need to investigate whether factors, such as the magnitude of the reward, are
contributing to the mixed results. In addition, many researchers have created alternative
versions of the task that have proven useful. Crowley et al. (2010) modified the task for
the fMRI environment. He coined this new task the Colorado Balloon Task, which has
been shown to be sensitive to substance use and gender differences (Crowley et al.,
2010). Alterations of the task, can be useful in certain populations, but make it more
difficult to ascertain why some studies show that the BART is able to differentiate
substance users and controls and other studies are not.
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In general, the BART can be a useful additional task that looks at decisionmaking. Unlike the IGT, the amount of risk changes over time on the BART. It is very
unlikely that the balloon will pop after just one pump of air. However, every time
additional air is added to the balloon, the risk is increased that the balloon is going to pop,
making it so that each decision to further pump up the balloon is more risky than the last.
The individual must learn how much risk is appropriate to take in order to maximize their
profits. As mentioned before, individuals with SUD have more difficulty with decisions
in ambiguous situations than only risky ones (Brevers et al., 2012). The BART offers a
unique combination of both risk (how much air can the individual get into the balloon
before it pops) and ambiguity (it is completely unknown when the balloon will pop).
Unlike the IGT, an individual is also rewarded for taking greater risk on the task than
individuals who are risk averse. Previous research has shown that people, in general, are
risk averse (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & Schwartz,
1997). So having a task that rewards making risky decision-making can be useful,
because making risky decisions is not always a bad thing. For example, people with
power (such as business executives) or people who are seeking power tend to make
riskier decisions than those who do not (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Ronay & von
Hippel, 2010). Ronay and van Hippel (2010) used the BART to show that men equate
making riskier decisions with gaining power. They found that males with higher
testosterone showed greater risk-taking when primed with low power, and when primed
with high power, higher testosterone males took fewer risks (Ronay & von Hippel, 2010).
It is interesting to note that making very risky decisions can be advantageous for some
people (e.g., businesspeople), but quite detrimental to others (e.g., individuals with SUD).
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Results from all of these studies help show that the BART helps assess a slightly different
aspect of decision-making that still seems to be important when looking at addiction
(Lejuez, et al., 2003).
Delay Discounting
“Discounting” is the concept that delaying a consequence, or decreasing the
probability of its occurrence, decreases its effect on behavior. Discounting is an
important construct because it can have a direct effect on reward processing and decisionmaking. One measure of discounting, temporal discounting, investigates how individuals
value long-term rewards in favor of short-term rewards (Kirby & Maraković, 1996). In
general, research has shown that individuals with SUD devalue long-term rewards in
favor of short-term rewards to a much greater extent than controls (Andrade & Petry,
2012; Businelle et al., 2010; Kollins, 2003; Petry, 2001).
In general, for temporal-discounting tasks, an individual will be presented with
two options and has to choose one of them. Usually these options are monetary, but they
do not have to be (e.g., cigarettes or medical treatment; Weatherly, Terrell, & Derenne,
2010; Weatherly & Terrell, 2010). For the purpose of describing the task, monetary
values will be used. The individual is presented with two options. The first option will
be a lower amount of money and the individual can choose to immediately take this
amount of money. The second choice will be a higher amount of money, though the
individual would have to wait some amount of time before collecting the money. For
example, an individual may be asked if he/she would prefer $5 now or $100 dollars in
two weeks. The amount of money and the timeframe can be manipulated in this
example.
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In theory, as the length of time increases the person will be more and more likely
to take the immediate reward rather than wait. For example, an individual would be more
likely to select to wait two weeks for the $100 than if he/she had to wait 10 years.
Alternatively, the closer the monetary values reach each other the more likely the
individual would be to select the immediate reward. For example, an individual would be
more likely to select that he/she wants $90 now rather than wait two weeks for $100 than
if he/she was offered $5 now verses $100 in two weeks. By repeatedly asking an
individual such questions, one can find a hypothetical amount where he/she is no longer
willing to wait for the delayed reward and chart this number over several delay periods (1
week, 2 weeks, 1 year, 5 years, etc.).
The way the task has been outlined above is only one example of how discounting
information can be collected. The individual chooses either the immediate or delayed
reward. Fill-in-the-blank and multiple-choice methods have also been developed and
shown to be valid (Weatherly & Derenne, 2011). In these methods, the individual simply
chooses at what point he/she will no longer wait for the money (either by writing it in or
selecting from a list of preselected answers). Some individuals will discount faster than
others; that is, he/she devalues the long-term reward in favor of what he/she can
immediately have.
There are two main methods for analyzing the delay-discounting data. First, the
rate of change over time can be observed. This rate-of-change can be modeled using a
hyperbolic function or an exponential one (Kirby & Maraković, 1995). In general,
hyperbolic has been shown to fit the data better than the exponential curve, but both

13

methods tend to underestimate the rate of discounting (Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Kirby &
Maraković, 1995). Below is the standard hyperbolic equation used to model the data:
= /(1 +

)

In this equation, (V) is the individual’s current subjective value of the delayed reward,
(A) is the amount of the delayed reward, (D) is the time delay to the reward, and (k) is an
individual constant representing the rate of devaluation of the reward. The constant in
the equation (k) can then be compared across individuals. The higher the value of k, then
the more rapidly an individual devalues rewards as they become increasingly delayed.
This analysis assumes that the data fit a hyperbolic curve, though this assumption
is not necessarily true. It makes little sense to try and fit non-hyperbolic data to this
function. Johnson and Bickel (2008) devised a method for removing data that violated
this assumption. In their method, they were able to identify individuals with erratic
response patterns where k would over- or underestimate the devaluation of the reward.
The data from these individuals were then excluded from the analysis. Johnson and
Bickel’s criteria sometimes removed a substantial portion of the data, which is
problematic. It can be argued why or why not it is important to remove nonsystematic
data, but this argument becomes difficult, almost meaningless, when data from a third of
the participants are removed from the data pool, and limits the interpretability of the
remaining findings.
An alternative method for analyzing discounting data is to calculate the Area
Under the Curve (AUC; Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001). In this method, the
data do not need to fit a hyperbolic curve, though the method is vaguer about the rate of
discounting (Myerson et al., 2001). To calculate AUC, the data are normalized and
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plotted on XY axes. X is the delayed value and Y is the subjective value. Both these
numbers are normalized by turning them into proportions so the delay (x) is expressed as
a proportion of the maximum delay, and the subjective value (y) is divided by the actual,
delayed amount. Once these points are plotted on the XY axes, a line is drawn to connect
each point as well as a vertical line from each point to the X axis. These lines create
several trapezoids under the curve. The area of each trapezoid is found by using the
following formula:
=(

−

)[(

+

)⁄2)]

In this equation, x1 and x2 are the delays, and y1 and y2 are the subjective values of the
delays. The area of each trapezoid is added up to get the total AUC. This method gives a
value between 0 (steepest discounting) and 1 (no discounting), therefore a higher AUC
would mean less discounting. There are several benefits to this technique over
hyperbolic k. The method does not assume a function for the rate of discounting and can
handle skewed data better than previous methods developed (Myerson et al., 2001).
Many studies report that individuals with SUD will devalue long-term rewards at
a faster rate than controls (Andrade & Petry, 2012; Businelle et al., 2010; Kirby, Petry, &
Bickel, 1999; Kollins, 2003; Petry, 2001; Thompson et al., 2012). For example, Kirby,
Petry, and Bickel (1999) found that heroin addicts discounted at a steeper rate compared
to controls. However, not all future studies could replicate this finding (Leeman &
Potenza, 2012). These inconsistent results may reflect differences in delay-discounting
tasks and analyses (Reynolds, 2006). Many previous studies, for example, compared
groups by fitting hyperbolic curves to estimate discounting rates and end up excluding a
large portion of participants. A particularly interesting finding is that individuals who
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have both gambling and substance-use problems tend to discount at a steeper rate than if
they only have an SUD or gambling problem (Andrade & Petry, 2012; Petry, 2001). This
finding suggests that both disorders have an additive effect on discounting and that
individuals who are comorbid with both disorders may be particularly prone to poor
decision-making.
Although delay discounting is another measure of decision-making, it is unique
compared to the IGT and BART. Unlike the IGT and BART, delay discounting is not
investigating decision-making in ambiguous or risky situations. There is little ambiguity
in this task, as both the amount of the reward and the delay period is explicitly laid out
for the individual. The mixed findings on this task are interesting and raise the question
of whether individuals with SUD are poor at decision making in general or only in
ambiguous circumstances (Brevers et al., 2012). Also, delay discounting is not based on
any sort of gambling paradigm (though is still considered gambling by the definition
presented earlier), which will be discussed further below. It is important to note that this
task measures decision-making in a very different way from the IGT and BART. Future
research is important to flesh out what populations of SUD and under what circumstances
differences in delay discounting are seen. Regardless of the limitations, this task has
been widely used. A search on PubMed using the terms “addiction” and “delay
discounting” in December 2013 revealed over 70 empirically based studies published
since 2007 showing some relationship between discounting and addiction. The task has
been sensitive to many substance-use populations and results can be compared alongside
many other studies making this task particularly useful when looking at decision-making
in individuals with SUD.
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Effects of Other Constructs on Decision-Making
Poor decision-making in substance users is also related to personality traits such
as impulsivity, risk-taking, and behavioral approach (i.e., the willingness to approach
potential rewards). A vast literature has shown that drug and alcohol addictions are
associated with impulsivity (Leeman & Potenza, 2012; Lejuez et al., 2010). One measure
of impulsivity, temporal discounting, has shown that individuals with SUD devalue longterm rewards in favor of short-term rewards to a much greater extent than controls
(Andrade & Petry, 2012; Ledgerwood, Alessi, Phoenix, & Petry, 2009; Leeman &
Potenza, 2012; Petry, 2001). Individuals with SUD also take greater risks than controls
(Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, et al., 2003; Rogers et al., 1999). Impulsivity and risk-taking,
together, have been shown to increase the probability of initial drug experimentation over
either construct alone (Dayan, Bernard, Olliac, Mailhes, & Kermarrec, 2010; Lejuez et
al., 2010; Poulos, Le, & Parker, 1995). Substance users also tend to have a greater
propensity for behavioral approach, which is the willingness to approach rewards, than
controls (Franken & Muris, 2006; Krmpotich et al., 2013; Simons, Dvorak, & LauBarraco, 2009; Van Toor et al., 2011; Wardell, Read, Colder, & Merrill, 2012). Suhr and
Tsnadis (2007) found that poor decision-making was related to variables such as
behavioral approach, in particular fun-seeking.
In addition to personality traits, the type of drug used may also play a role in
decision-making deficits. Many individuals in the substance-use literature are
polysubstance users, making it difficult to determine what effect particular drugs have on
variables like decision-making. However, there is some evidence to suggest that not all
substances have the same effect on decision-making (Gonzalez, Bechara, & Martin,
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2007). In particular, alcohol and psychostimulants (e.g., methamphetamine, cocaine,
crack, etc.) seem to have the most robust effects on decision-making, although this deficit
in decision-making seems particularly pronounced with psychostimulants (Gonzalez et
al., 2007). Gonzalez et al. (2007) compared a group of alcohol users, methamphetamine
users, and controls on the IGT and found that performance in both patient groups were
lower than controls, but methamphetamine users performed even more poorly than
alcohol users.
Reward Contingencies
Different reward contingencies may be processed by different areas of the brain
(Elliott, Dolan, & Frith, 2000). For example, lateral and medial OFC may play different
roles in decision-making (Elliott et al., 2000). In general, medial OFC seems to be more
strongly implemented in motivation, uncertainty, valuation, and effort (Tanabe et al.,
2013), whereas lateral OFC seems to be more involved with processing aversive
outcomes or suppressing unrewarding responses (Elliott et al., 2000; Seymour et al.,
2005). For reward contingencies, the brain processes magnitude and frequency of
rewards/punishers differently. Lateral OFC seems to be more involved in the frequency
of rewards. For example, Strenziock et al. (2010) found that decreased grey-matter
volume in the lateral OFC was more associated with adolescent boys who frequently
watch violent television shows and movies compared to boys with greater medial OFC
volume. Medial OFC works in conjunction with the striatum (particularly ventral) to
process the magnitude of rewards (Diekhof, Kaps, Falkai, & Gruber, 2012). Changes in
medial OFC seem to be more robust in SUD than lateral OFC. Structurally, there is
reduced volume in the medial OFC in substance users using volume-based, and cortical
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thickness, measures (Kühn, Schubert, & Gallinat, 2010; Tanabe et al., 2009, 2013).
Functionally, there is also less activity in the medial OFC of stimulant dependent
individuals compared to controls (Tanabe et al., 2007). Substance-dependent individuals
have also been shown to be worse than controls at avoiding cards with high magnitude
loss during a modified version of the IGT (Thompson et al., 2012). Together, these
findings suggest that there may be problems for individuals with SUD when processing
the magnitude of rewards/punishers, as opposed to frequency.
One of the criticisms of the IGT has been how many contingences are
manipulated at once. For example, each time a card is chosen, the individual
simultaneous receives both a reward and a punisher. Having multiple contingencies
simultaneously makes it difficult to differentiate the processes underlining rewards and
punishers using the IGT. The IGT is sensitive to showing that substance users have a
deficit, but it had been very difficult to untangle what is causing these differences using
this task. Computational modeling has been one approach to help untangle these
differences in decision-making. The basis for these models are from machine-learning
paradigms (Watkins & Dayan, 1992). In the model by Watkins and Dayan, a
mathematical equation is used to represent the quality of learning (Q-Learning) and
attempts to identify factors that could be attributing to why some people learn more
efficiently than others.
Stout et al. (2004) used a similar model looking at expectancy valence – in other
words, internal factors that may affect learning. They found that using a computational
model on the IGT showed that poor performance in cocaine users is related to a
hyposensitivity to loss and an erratic response pattern that may be driven by high levels
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of impulsivity (Stout et al., 2004). Computational modeling has also shown that
individuals with SUD have altered predictive-error (Tanabe et al., 2013). Prediction error
is the difference between what one expects from an action and what actually happens.
Tanabe et al. (2013) showed that SUD had a dampened prediction error signal in the
medial OFC and the ventral striatum while performing a modified version of the IGT.
Together, these studies help illustrate how important it is to look into the mechanisms
that are problematic for individuals with SUD for decision-making. It is crucial for
future research to continue looking at decision-making in ways to help untangle these
intricate differences.
Addiction and Decision-Making
Many studies have shown that individuals with SUD have deficits in decisionmaking. This same trend is seen in individuals with gambling disorder, that is these
individuals show similar decision-making deficits on the IGT, BART, and delay
discounting (Leeman & Potenza, 2012). Another proposed disorder of addiction for the
DSM-6 is Internet-Gaming Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Research has shown that individuals who excessively game (in this case, World of
Warcraft) also show deficits on the IGT compared to controls, suggesting impaired
decision-making (Pawlikowski & Brand, 2011). Even individuals with some eating
disorders show deficits in decision-making that are very similar to addiction (Frank et al.,
2012). Frank et al. (2012), showed deficits in prediction error signal in individuals with
anorexia nervosa and obesity, similar to what is seen in addiction (Tanabe et al., 2013).
In fact, explaining eating disorders using a model of addiction is getting more and more
popular in the field of addiction (Volkow & Wise, 2005) though not everyone agrees
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with this decision (Wilson, 2010). All of these studies show that addiction, in of itself,
has an adverse effect on decision-making. Especially because additive effects on delay
discounting have been shown with substance use and gambling (Andrade & Petry, 2012;
Petry, 2001), it may be very important to focus on all aspects of addiction when
investigating decision-making. This idea is especially crucial with substance use and
gambling with the many similarities between these disorders (Leeman & Potenza, 2012).
Motivation for Substance Use and Gambling
Individuals with addiction continue to use drugs or gamble despite long-term
consequences (Bechara, 2003), highlighting the importance of researching why
individuals maintain these behaviors. One explanation for gambling and substance use
motivation, is that drug use and gambling can be maintained through positive
reinforcement (e. g., feeling more excited) or negative reinforcement (e. g., feeling less
stressed or anxious). Using substances for negative reinforcement has been shown to be
a predictor from initial drug use to addiction (Gerevich & Bácskai, 1996). Individuals
with SUD have been shown to have deficits in negative reinforcement learning, and are
unable to learn as well how to avoid negative outcomes compared to controls (Thompson
et al., 2012). Together, these results suggest that negative reinforcement learning is an
important construct in the maintenance and motivation for substance use. Similarly,
individuals who gamble for negative reinforcement were much more likely to have
gambling problems (Weatherly & Miller, 2013). These findings suggest that the
motivation for drug use may also play a critical role in gambling and decision-making
behavior.
Alcohol Use Functional Assessment (AFA)
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Using substances for negative reinforcement has been shown to be a predictor
from initial drug use to addiction (Gerevich & Bácskai, 1996), and individuals with
addiction have been shown to be less sensitive to negative-reinforcement learning
compared to controls (Thompson et al., 2012). A preliminary scale, the Alcohol Use
Function Assessment (AFA), has been designed to assess positive and negative
reinforcement contingencies for engaging in substance use. The 24-item AFA has two
subscales: one about substance use for positive reinforcement and one for negative
reinforcement. This scale has been validated (Krmpotich, unpublished data) showing
good construct, divergent, and convergent validity. The AFA offers a way to investigate
the relationship between alcohol use motivation and decision-making. A similar scale,
the Substance Use Functional Assessment has been validated and used to shown that
negative reinforcement mediates negative affect and addiction severity (Krmpotich et al.,
unpublished data).
The Drinking Motives Questionnaire - Revised
Cooper (1994) originally developed the Drinking Motives Questionnaire to assess
for reasons why adolescents engage in alcohol consumption. The questionnaire was based
on a four factor model originally proposed by Cox and Klinger (1988). Her analysis
supported the model proposed by Cox and Klinger and the scale was validated across
gender, race, and age (Cooper, 1994). The four factors assessed for both internal and
external reasons for drinking as well as positive and negative reinforcement: Social
(drinking to obtain positive social rewards; external positive reinforcement), Coping
(drinking to reduce or regulate negative emotions; internal negative reinforcement),
Enhancement (drinking to enhance positive mood or well-being, internal positive
reinforcement) and Conformity (drinking to avoid social censure or rejection; external
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negative reinforcement). Later research suggested that a 5-factor model may also explain
the data (Grant et al., 2007), but the 4-factor model will be retained in this study for easy
evaluation of positive and negative reinforcement.
Gambling Functional Assessment –Revised
Dixon and Johnson (2007) developed the Gambling Functional Assessment
(GFA). The task looks at motivations for why people gamble, and was composed of 22
items. Later the task was updated (Gambling Functional Assessment – Revised;
Weatherly, Miller, Montes, & Rost, 2012). A factor analysis also revealed 2 main
factors, and 8 questions loaded on each factor. The authors’ interpreted these two factors
as gambling for positive motivation and gambling for negative motivation or escape.
This 16-item scale measures why people engage in gambling, focusing on this idea of
gambling for positive reinforcement as opposed to negative reinforcement (Weatherly et
al., 2012). Weatherly and Miller (2013) went on to show that gambling as an escape was
more heavily related to developing problems with gambling.
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS)
Lesieur and Blume (1987) developed the South Oaks Gambling Task (SOGS) as a
quick measure to screen for individuals who may be experiencing problems from
gambling based on DSM-3 criteria. The SOGS, in and of itself, is not a diagnostic tool,
but can be useful in identifying individuals who may have a gambling disorder. The
SOGS is an 16-item questionnaire and one of the most widely used diagnostic screens for
pathological gambling (Stinchfield, 2002). The SOGS can accurately detect individuals
who truly do have problems with gambling, though the SOGS also has a high falsepositive rate among the general population (Stinchfield, 2002). This tool has been used
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to identify substance users with gambling problems in previous research (Tanabe et al.,
2007).

Current Study
Many of the decision-making tasks involve gambling and gambling paradigms
and therefore it is important to understand how gambling relates to decision-making,
especially in individuals who use substances. To date, little research has investigated
substance users’ performance on actual gambling tasks such as a slot machine. One way
to assess the role of gambling is to compare an actual measure of gambling (slot-machine
performance) to measures of decision-making (i.e., IGT, BART, & delay discounting).
Finding out how substance users gamble compared to controls could offer valuable
insight into how gambling is related to decision-making for substance users.
The goal of this study was to investigate how individuals with SUD will perform
on a slot machine and relate the slot-machine performance to current lab measures of
decision-making. Individuals with and without substance use disorders gambled on a slot
machine and completed other decision-making tasks (e.g., IGT, BART, delay
discounting). The recruited individuals had substance use problems with alcohol, as
alcohol and psychostimulants have been shown to be particularly pronounced with
decision-making deficits (Gonzalez et al., 2007). Alcohol use disorders are also common
in a college-student population.
Rewards were manipulated in terms of magnitude (real monetary payout verses
no payout) for two reasons. First, the magnitude of reward and punishment has been
shown to be robust in this population (Thompson et al., 2012). Second, having real
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monetary payout on the decision-making paradigms and slot machine may increase the
ecological validity of the task and be easier to relate them to real-world decision-making
(Fernie & Tunney, 2006). Gambling performance was compared to three common lab
measures of decision-making (i.e., IGT, BART, & delay discounting). In addition,
measures of substance use and gambling motivation were obtained to relate the slotmachine paradigm to meaningful reasons for engaging in addictive behaviors.
There were three primary hypothesizes. First, individuals with alcohol-use
symptoms would gamble more and for higher stakes at the slot machines than controls,
especially when real monetary (high magnitude) stakes were involved. Second,
performance on the slot machine would be related to other tasks of decision-making.
Finally, poor performance on all decision-making tasks (slot machine, IGT, BART, &
delay discounting) would relate to using substances and gambling as an escape and not
for maintain a positive state.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants
Seven-hundred fifty-one participants were recruited from the undergraduate
psychology program at the University of North Dakota. These participants received
course credit for completing a screening survey (detailed below). From the pool of 751
initial participants, 40 (5%) participants were recruited to take part in main portion of the
study (detailed below). These participants received both additional course credit as well
as monetary compensation. The number of participants needed for the study was
calculated using G-Power v3.1. The calculation was based on a power of 0.80 using a
small effect size (Cohen’s F = 0.15). Participants were selected to take part in the main
part of study if they met inclusion criteria for one of the following groups: Alcohol Use
Symptoms (AUS) or controls. Participants in the AUS group self-reported at least two
symptoms of an Alcohol Use Disorder, in the last year, as defined in the DSM-V. These
individuals may not actually be diagnosed with an Alcohol Use Disorder by a clinician,
but are reporting some potentially maladaptive symptoms. Self-reported symptoms in the
last year from other substance use disorders, including tobacco use disorder, were not
exclusionary. Individuals in the control group did not self-report any symptoms from any
substance use disorder in the last year. Caffeine use was not assessed, as the DSM-V
does not recognize caffeine-use disorder. All participants who scored a 5 or higher on the
SOGS, were excluded due to the possibility of Gambling Disorder. Seventeen
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individuals were recruited for the AUS group and 23 individuals were recruited for the
control group. The study was approved the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the
University of North Dakota.

Materials
Slot Machine
As a measure of gambling, participants gambled on an IGT S2000 Red, White,
and Blue slot machine. The machine had a playback percentage of 97%. In other words,
for every dollar the slot machine took in it dispensed, on average, 97 cents back. The
machine accepted tokens worth $0.05, and participants could bet 1-3 tokens on each spin.
Participants started each condition with 50 tokens ($2.50). The conditioned ended when
one of three requirements was met: the participant decided to stop, 10 minutes had
elapsed, or the participant ran out of tokens. Instructions for the task are presented in
Appendix A. Three dependent variables of interest were measured - the number of trials
played, the total number of tokens bet, and the amount bet on average each trial. The
number of trials and the number of coins bet were recorded by the internal control board
on the slot machine as well as hand tallied by one of the researchers, whom was
observing the participant. The number of bets per trial was calculated by dividing the
total number of coins bet by the total number of trials.
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)
As a measure of decision-making, participants completed this computerized card
game in which the participant selects a card from one of four decks (Bechara et al.,
2003). Every time that the participant selects a card, he/she either wins some amount of
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hypothetical money, or intermittently loses some money. The monetary gain for each
deck remained the same but the monetary loss varied among the different cards in each
deck, ranging from the participant losing no hypothetical money to the participant losing
a very large amount of hypothetical money. Each deck had a different payout schedule.
In Decks A and C, the losses were of small magnitude, but very frequent, and in Decks B
and D the losses were infrequent but of a much larger magnitude. The participant must
learn over time to select cards from the decks with better payout schedules (C and D) and
stop selecting cards from the “bad” decks A and B. The participant had to select 100
cards from the decks over the course of the game. The dependent variable was the total
number of plays on good decks minus the number of cards selected on the bad decks
(Bechara et al., 2003). The IGT has been shown to have very good construct validity
(Buelow & Suhr, 2009) .
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART)
For a second measure of decision-making, participants completed this
computerized task (Lejuez et al. 2002) in which they earned hypothetical money by
incrementally increasing the size of a balloon. In this task, participants were presented
with 30 balloons. The participant decided whether he/she wanted to pump air into the
balloon or not. Every time the participant decided to pump air into the balloon, he/she
collected a small amount of money (i.e., one cent per pump). However, at some point the
balloon would pop. If the balloon popped, the participant lost all of the money that
the/she earned on that balloon. On average, each balloon popped after 64 pumps. Each
trial required a decision between increasing earnings versus “collecting” money already
earned. The dependent variable was the average number of pumps, excluding balloons
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that popped (Lejuez et al. 2002). The BART has shown adequate validity as a measure of
risk-taking using genetic markers (Hopko et al., 2006) as well as good temporal stability
(rtt>0.70; White, Lejuez, & de Wit, 2008).
Delay Discounting
As a third measure of decision-making, participants completed a computerized
discounting task in which they made decisions to collect a hypothetical reward at some
time in the future or a lesser amount now. Two different rewards were used: money
($1000) and alcohol (100 bottles of preferred liquor or wine). There were seven delay
periods (1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 5 years, & 10 years). The multiplechoice method was used to collect the responses (Weatherly & Derenne, 2011). To
assess the rate of discounting of delayed reward, we used two approaches: (1) estimating
the discounting rate from the hyperbolic equation: V = A/(1 + kD) and (2) computing
AUC for each participant’s response trajectory. Both these methods were calculated with
and without applying the criteria by Johnson and Bickel (2008) for removing nonsystematic data.
Alcohol Use Functional Assessment (AFA)
A preliminary scale, the AFA, has been designed to assess positive and negative
reinforcement contingencies for engaging in substance use. This 24-item scale attempts
to measure why people engage in substance use. Questions are answered on a scale
ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (All the time). The AFA has two subscales: one about
substance use for positive reinforcement (11 items) and one for negative reinforcement
(13 items). Responses for both subscales are summed. Dependent variables were the
total scores on the positive and negative subscales. This scale has been validated
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(Krmpotich, unpublished data) showing good construct, divergent, and convergent
validity. The AFA offers a way to investigate the relationship between alcohol use
motivation and decision-making. This scale is presented in Appendix B.
The Drinking Motives Questionnaire - Revised
The Drinking Motives Questionnaire assessed for reasons why adolescents
engage in alcohol consumption (Cooper, 1994). There are four subscales: Social
(drinking to obtain positive social rewards; external positive reinforcement), Coping
(drinking to reduce or regulate negative emotions; internal negative reinforcement),
Enhancement (drinking to enhance positive mood or well-being, internal positive
reinforcement) and Conformity (drinking to avoid social censure or rejection; external
negative reinforcement). The scale consists of 20 items that are rated on a 5-point Likertlike scale (almost never to almost always). Five items load onto each of the four factors.
The scale has shown good construct validity for both the 4 factor model (Cooper at al.,
1994; Kuntsche et al., 2008) and the five factor model (Grant et al., 2007).
Gambling Functional Assessment – Revised (GFA-R)
This 16-item scale measures why people engage in gambling (Weatherly et al.,
2012). Questions are answered on a scale ranging from 0 (Never) to 6 (Always). The
GFA-R has two subscales: one about gambling for positive reinforcement (8 items) and
one for negative reinforcement (8 items). Responses for both 8-item subscales are
summed. Dependent variables were the total scores on the positive and negative
subscales. This scale has been validated (Weatherly, Dymond, Samuels, Austin, &
Terrell, 2014) and has been shown to have good reliability (α ranges from 0.69 to 0.95, rtt
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ranges from 0.40 to 0.74; Weatherly et al., 2012) and construct validity (Weatherly et al.,
2011).
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS)
The SOGS is an 16-item questionnaire and the most widely used diagnostic
screen for pathological gambling (Lesieur & Blume, 1987). This 16-item questionnaire
assesses problems with gambling and a score of 3 or higher likely indicates that the
individual has problems from gambling. This measure has been shown to have good
reliability (α ranges from 0.69 to 0.86) and validity, though there is a high false-positive
rate (Stinchfield, 2002).
Procedure
All participants were provided written and informed consent as approved by the
University of North Dakota’s Institutional Review Board. An initial, large group of
participants complete a screening process through the use of SONA, an online
department system for research participation. This screening contained a demographics
questionnaire, questions about drug use, a delay-discounting paradigm, the AFA, the
GFA-R, and the SOGS. Those who qualified for the study (met criteria for the AUS or
control group as outlined above) was then recruited to play on a slot machine and
complete the IGT and BART. All three of these tasks were completed twice. Magnitude
of the reward was be manipulated by offering conditions with real monetary payout and
without. The order of the trials was counterbalanced across participants via a balanced
Latin square method. For the slot machine, each condition lasted until one of the
following criteria was met: 10 minutes passed, the participant decided to quit, or the
participant ran out of tokens. The monetary payment was calculated as follows: for the
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IGT, the total amount of money at the end of the task was divided by 1000; for BART
and the slot machine the participant collected whatever amount of money that he/she
earned on the task. Participation took approximately 1 hour.
Design
This study was a 2x2 mixed-design quasi experiment. The pseudo independent
variable was the presence of alcohol use disorders symptoms from the DSM-5. This
variable had two levels: AUS (at least 2 symptoms) and control (no symptoms). The
main dependent variables were measures of decision-making (slot machine, BART, IGT,
& delay discounting). These variables had two levels varying the magnitude of the
reward (no monetary compensation vs. monetary compensation). Other variables of
interest included motivation for substance use and gambling (AFA, DMQR, & GFA-R).
Dependent variables were inspected for homogeneity of variance and normal distribution.
All analyses were conducted using SPSS 21.
Hypothesis Analysis
The primary hypothesis was that individuals with AUS would gamble more and
for higher stakes at the slot machines than controls, especially when real monetary (high
magnitude) stakes are involved. To test this hypothesis, three 2x2 mixed-model ANOVA
were run, one for each of the dependent variables (the number of trials played, the total
amount bet, and the average amount bet on each trial). The pseudo independent variable
would be the presence of AUS (two levels, control and AUS). The dependent variables
would have two levels varying the magnitude of the reward (no monetary compensation
vs. monetary compensation).
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The second hypothesis was that performance on the slot machine will relate to
other tasks of decision-making. This hypothesis was assessed in several different ways:
mixed model ANOVAs, correlations, and a Cluster Analysis.
First, 2x2 mixed-model ANOVAs for IGT and BART, set up as previously
described for the slot machine, were run. The dependent variable for IGT was the total
number of plays on good decks minus the number of cards selected on the bad decks
(Good minus Bad), and the average number of pumps, excluding balloons that popped
(Pump minus Pop) for the BART. For delay discounting, the same analysis was run
except the within-subject factor was the object being delayed (money verses alcohol).
There are two dependent variables for delay discounting (i.e., hyperbolic k and AUC).
Johnson and Bickel’s (2008) algorithm for nonsystematic data was not applied because,
with these criteria in place, 65% of the data would be eliminated. For hyperbolic k,
skewness and kurtosis suggested that the data were highly non-normally distributed. For
this reason, the analysis used only used AUC. These ANOVAS were run to get a sense
of how this group of participants were performing on decision-making tasks.
Second, the main dependent variables on all of the tasks were correlated with each
other as well as the measure of gambling (i.e., slot machine) to see how similar these
tasks are at explaining the variance seen in the data. The following dependent variables
were used: slot machine (average number of tokens bet per trial), IGT (Good minus Bad),
BART (Pump minus Pop), delay discounting (AUC for monetary discounting). Only
data from the no-monetary condition were used because this method is the typical
administration of these tasks. The following correlations were run: slot machine and
IGT, slot machine and BART, slot machine and delay discounting, IGT and BART, IGT
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and delay discounting, and BART and delay discounting. A Bonferonni correction for
alpha suggested that alpha needed to be adjusted from 0.05 to 0.008 (.05/6) to correct for
the increased possibility of a Type I error. A Pearson’s r was used for normally
distributed data and Spearman’s rho for non-normally distributed data.
Third, a Cluster Analysis was run to see which tasks participants performed the
most similar on. A Custer Analysis groups a set of objects in such a way that objects in
the same cluster are more similar to each other than to those in other clusters (Kaufman
and Rousseeuw 1990). These groups of objects are typically cases, or participants in
psychological research; however these objects can be other things such different diseases,
laboratory tests, training methods, behavioral patterns, factors of human performance,
organizations, school courses, languages, and test items to name a few (Anderberg,
2014). Cluster analysis can also be used to determine structure of the data in a similar
manner to factor analysis (Punj and Stewart, 1983). Cluster analysis can be used to look
at cases or objects as well as attributes of these objects (dependent variables, this is
accomplished by reversing the data matrix; Romesburg, 2004). This is especially useful
in finding redundant data (Anderberg, 2014). In other words, a cluster analysis can be
useful to see which decision-making are similar (i.e., that they are measuring the same
thing – being redundant with each other). A factor analysis was not chosen, as the
sampling adequacy was considered to be “miserable” (KMO = .59) and the data did not
appear to be appropriately correlated for factor analysis (Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, p =
0.43). The same four dependent variables that were used for the correlations were used
in the cluster analysis: used slot machine (average number of tokens bet per trial), IGT
(Good minus Bad), BART (Pump minus Pop), delay discounting (AUC for monetary
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discounting). An Agglomerate Hierarchical Cluster procedure was used to group
together using a between-linkage grouping to combine four objects: slot machine, IGT,
BART and delay discounting. This procedure is appropriate to use when all measures are
continuous variables. This procedure meant that the four tasks each started out as
separate cluster and, at each stage of the analysis, the two clusters that were the closest in
distance (measured using squared Euclidian distance) were combined into one cluster.
This process repeated combing two more clusters at each stage until there was only one
cluster left. The analysis is recommended to stop when the distance between clusters that
are being combined increases by a much larger amount that previous stages.
To assess for the final hypothesis, multiple regressions were run to see if
performance on the IGT, BART, and slot machine could predict reasons for using alcohol
or gambling. This direction for the regression was chosen to investigate if any of these
measures are able to predict reasons for why people may be using drugs or alcohol. This
question is useful to answer since it will help determine what the utility of these tasks are
and if these tasks are assessing motivating states that have been associated with
problematic drinking or gambling. Tasks were investigated separately in the monetary
condition and the non-monetary condition to see if the magnitude of the effect would play
a role, as the magnitude of the reward has been shown to be an important factor in
decision-making deficits seen in SUD (Thompson et al., 2011). All multiple regressions
were run using a bias corrected accelerated (BCa) bootstrapping procedure with 5000
iterations because some of the data were not normally distributed. The BCa method for
bootstrapping is one way to help use nonsystematic data in a regression analysis
(Carpenter and Bithell, 2000). Data transformations were not used due to the
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transformed data still not being normally distributed. Regression models were only run
using data from individuals in the AUS group because the control group had a very
restricted range of data on these measures. Regressions were run separately for the
monetary and non-monetary conditions. Collinearity measures were checked to see if
there were any issues with multi-collinearity between the measures of decision making
that could interfere with the validity of the regression model. VIF needed to be less than
10, and tolerance needed to be greater than 0.2. Multi-collinearity was not an issue in
any of the models. The following dependent variables were used: DMQ-R Social
Subscale, DMQ-R Coping Subscale, DMQ-R Enhancement Subscale, DMQ-R
Conformity scale, AFA Positive Reinforcement Subscale, AFA Negative Reinforcement
Subscale, GFA-R Positive Reinforcement Subscale, and the GFA-R Negative
Reinforcement Subscale. This analysis consisted of a total of 16 regression models. A
Bonferonni correction for alpha suggested that alpha needed to be adjusted from 0.05 to
0.003 (0.05/16) to correct for the increased possibility of a Type I error.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Demographics
All demographic data are presented in Table 1. There were no differences
between the number of men and women in each group (χ2 = 0.40, p = 0.53). There were
no differences in age between the groups (t(38) = 1.02, p = 0.32). Control participants
(M = 3.48, SD = 0.35) reported a higher GPA on average than AUS participants (M =
3.08, SD = 0.60; t(34) = 2.47, p = 0.04).

Alcohol and Substance Use
Some controls reported drug or alcohol use (i.e., more than five times in their
life). Eleven (48%) controls reported drinking alcohol, one (4%) reported using
cannabis, one (4%) reported using tobacco, and one (4%) reported using prescription
stimulants (i.e., not as prescribed). All controls denied any DSM-V symptoms from any
drug or alcohol use disorder. No control participants reported that they thought their
alcohol or drug use was a problem.
All AUS participants reported some drug or alcohol use (i.e., more than five times
in their life). All AUS participants reported drinking alcohol, six (35%) reported using
cannabis, four (24%) reported using tobacco, and one (6%) reported using sedatives. Ten
(59%) AUS participants rated that they had the most problems from their alcohol use,
four (24%) denied any drug was more problematic than another, and three (18%) reported
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having the most problems from a drug other than alcohol. All AUS participants reported
that they used alcohol at least once a month, and over half (53%) reported that they use
alcohol at least once a week. On average, AUS participants reported 3.29 (SD = 1.65)
DSM-V alcohol use symptoms, and 4.18 (SD = 2.83) DSM-5 symptoms from all drugs
categories combined. Five (29%) AUS participants reported that they thought their
alcohol or drug use was a problem.

Decision-Making Tasks
Data for the slot machine task, IGT and BART are presented in Figure 1. Data for
delay discount tasks are presented in Figure 2.
Slot Machine: Number of Trials
Skewness and kurtosis values suggested that the data could be considered
normally distributed. There was homogeneity of variance between the groups (Box’s M
= 4.97, F(3, 115051) = 1.56, p = 0.20). There was no main effect of group (F(1, 38) =
0.34, p = 0.56; η2 = 0.01; power = 0.09). There was no main effect of magnitude (F(1,
38) = 1.00; p = 0.32; η2 = 0.03; power = 0.16). There was no significant interaction
between group and magnitude (F(1, 38) = 0.06, p = 0.81; η2 < 0.01; power = 0.06).
Slot Machine: Number of Coins Bet
Skewness and kurtosis values suggested that the data could be considered
normally distributed. There was homogeneity of variance between the groups (Box’s M
= 2.86, F(3, 115051) = 0.90, p = 0.44). There was no main effect of group (F(1, 38) =
1.16, p = 0.29; η2 = 0.03; power = 0.18. There was no main effect of magnitude (F(1, 38)
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= 2.10; p = 0.16; η2 = 0.05; power = 0.29). There was no significant interaction between
group and magnitude (F(1, 38) = 0.004, p = 0.95; η2 < 0.001; power = 0.05).
Slot Machine: Bet per Trial
Skewness and kurtosis values suggested that the data could be considered
normally distributed. There was homogeneity of variance between the groups (Box’s M
= 2.87, F(3, 115051) = 0.09, p = 0.97). There was no main effect of group (F(1, 38) =
0.38, p = 0.54; η2 = 0.01; power = 0.09). There was a trend for a main effect of
magnitude (F(1, 38) = 3.51; p = 0.07; η2 = 0.09; power = 0.45). Participants tended to bet
more per trial if there was no monetary compensation (M = 1.62, SE = 0.06) compared to
if they received the amount of money that they had won or accumulated (M = 1.52, SD =
0.06). There was no significant interaction between group and magnitude (F(1, 38) =
0.31, p = 0.58; η2 < 0.01; power = 0.08).
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)
Skewness and kurtosis values suggested that the data could be considered
normally distributed. There was heterogeneity of variance between the groups (Box’s M
= 9.52, F(3, 115051) = 2.99, p = 0.03), increasing the potential for a Type I error. There
was no main effect of group (F(1, 38) = 1.28, p = 0.27; η2 = 0.03; power = 0.20). There
was no main effect of magnitude (F(1, 38) = 0.11, p = 0.75; η2 < 0.01; power = 0.06).
There was no significant interaction between group and magnitude (F(1, 38) = 0.33, p =
0.57; η2 = 0.01; power = 0.09).
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART)
Skewness and kurtosis values suggested that the data could be considered
normally distributed. There was heterogeneity of variance between the groups (Box’s M
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= 13.09, F(3, 115051) = 4.11, p = 0.006), increasing the potential for a Type I error.
There was no main effect of group (F(1, 38) = 1.41, p = 0.24; η2 = 0.04; power = 0.21).
There was no a main effect of magnitude (F(1, 38) = 0.92; p = 0.34; η2 = 0.02; power =
0.16). There was no significant interaction between group and magnitude (F(1, 38) =
1.54, p = 0.22; η2 = 0.04; power = 0.23).
Delay Discounting
Eight participants were excluded from the analysis for not completing the task
leaving a total of 16 Controls and 16 AUS participants. For AUC, skewness and kurtosis
values suggested that the data could be considered normally distributed. There was
homogeneity of variance between the groups (Box’s M =0.27, F(3, 162000) = 0.80, p =
0.97). There was no main effect of group (F(1, 30) = 0.004, p = 0.95; η2 < 0.001; power
= 0.05). There was no difference between discounting between alcohol and money (F(1,
30) = 1.03; p = 0.32; η2 = 0.03; power = 0.17). There was no significant interaction
between group and magnitude (F(1, 30) = 0.38, p = 0.54; η2 = 0.01; power = 0.09).

Cluster Analysis
The Cluster Analysis started with four separate clusters: Monetary delay
discounting (AUC), slot machine (Control Bets per Trial), BART (Pump minus Pop), and
IGT (Good minus Bad). In the first stage of the analysis slot machine and delay
discounting were combined into a single cluster. For stage 2, the coefficient jump was
large suggesting that the analysis should end here (54.12 – 71.51 compared to stage 3,
71.51 -77.50). The analysis stopped with three clusters left (AUC & slot machine,
BART, IGT). This result suggests the only significant overlap was between the slot
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machine task and delay discounting. The correlation matrix for all the decision-making
tasks is presented in Table 2. The proximity matrix is presented in Table 3. The icicle
plot is presented in Figure 3. The dendrogram is presented in Figure 4.

Relationship to Motivation and Reinforcement Contingences
Multiple regressions were run to see if performance on the IGT, BART, and slot
machine could predict motivation and reinforcement contingences for using alcohol or
gambling.
Social
The decision-making tasks were able to predict using alcohol for social reasons in
the monetary condition (R2 = 0.69, p = 0.001) but not in the nonmonetary condition (R2
= 0.15, p = 0.53). In the monetary condition, both BART (β = 0.52, p = 0.04) and the slot
machine (β = 0.68, p = 0.01) were able to significantly predict the DMQR Social
subscale. There was a trend for IGT being a significant predictor (β = 0.35, p = 0.09).
Enhancement
The decision-making tasks were able to predict using alcohol for enhancement in
the monetary condition (R2 = 0.58, p = 0.002) but not in the nonmonetary condition (R2
= 0.16, p = 0.50). In the monetary condition, only the slot machine (β = 0.83, p = 0.003)
was able to significantly predict the DMQR Enhancement subscale. IGT (β = 0.10, p =
0.55) and BART (β = 0.15, p = 0.38) were not significant predictors of using alcohol for
enhancement.
Conformity
There was a trend for decision-making tasks predicting using alcohol for
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conditioning reasons in the monetary condition (R2 = 0.49, p = 0.03) but not in the
nonmonetary condition (R2 = 0.13, p = 0.61). In the monetary condition, the slot machine
(β = 0.81, p = 0.02) significantly predicted DMQR conformity subscale. There was a
trend for BART (β = 0.48, p = 0.11) predicting DMQR Conformity. IGT (β = -0.31, p =
0.27) was not a significant predictor of using alcohol for conformity.
Other Regressions
No other regressions were significant. Decision-making tasks were unable to
predict positive reinforcement maintaining gambling in the monetary (R2 = 0.23, p =
0.31) and nonmonetary conditions (R2 = 0.14, p = 0.58), negative reinforcement
maintaining gambling in the monetary (R2 = 0.05, p = 0.88) and nonmonetary conditions
(R2 = 0.01, p = 0.99), positive reinforcement maintaining alcohol use in the monetary
(R2 = 0.26, p = 0.25) and nonmonetary conditions (R2 = 0.12, p = 0.63), negative
reinforcement maintaining alcohol use in the monetary (R2 = 0.19, p = 0.41) and
nonmonetary conditions (R2 = 0.07, p = 0.82), and using alcohol for coping in the in the
monetary (R2 = 0.23, p = 0.33) and nonmonetary conditions (R2 = 0.11, p = 0.67).
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION

Study Goals and Main Findings
Overall, this study was completed to examine the relationship between gambling
and decision-making tasks in alcohol users. There were three main goals for this study.
The first goal was to investigate if individuals with AUS would gamble more and for
higher stakes at the slot machine than controls, especially when real monetary (high
magnitude) stakes were involved. The second goal was to compare performance on a slot
machine to decision-making tasks (i.e., IGT, BART, & delay discounting). The third
goal was to investigate if poor performance on decision-making tasks (i.e., slot machine,
IGT, & BART) was related to using substances and gambling as an escape. The data
failed to support any of the hypotheses. However, several important results were found.
First, all participants tended to bet more tokens per trial on the slot machine when there
was no monetary compensation compared to when there was actual compensation.
Second, no group or magnitude differences were found on any of the decision-making
tasks (i.e., IGT, BART, & delay discounting). Effect size and power suggested that this
finding was not a Type II error and that there does not seem to be any group or magnitude
differences on these tasks in this sample. Third, the slot machine and all the decisionmaking tasks seem to be relatively independent from each other. These tasks seem to
measure different aspects of decision-making and, surprisingly, do not have a lot of
overlap in explaining variance in the data or participant performance. Fourth,
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performance on the slot machine and the decision-making tasks was able to predict using
alcohol for positive reinforcement, in particular, for social situations and enhancing
positive feelings and experiences.

Slot-Machine Performance
For the slot machine, there were a couple of possible main effects of magnitude.
Though nothing reached statistical significance, power and effect sizes did not always
suggest that retaining the null was ideal. There was a medium effect size for an effect of
magnitude on the slot machine, which suggested that with more participants a result may
be detected. Effect sizes also suggested that the number of tokens bet may become
significant with the addition of more participants. If so, participants tended to bet more if
there was no monetary compensation (M = 66.14, SE = 6.03) compared to if they
received the amount of money that they had left or accumulated (M = 58.31, SE = 5.36).
Altogether, these results would suggest that participants across both groups tended to bet
less in the monetary condition compared to the non-monetary condition.
This result was opposite of what was hypothesized, which was that alcohol users
would bet more in the high-magnitude condition. Despite that the results did not line up
with the hypothesis, there is some empirical support that shows that, in general,
individuals are more conservative when receiving monetary payment on tasks (Weatherly
& Meier, 2007). Weatherly and Meier (2007) found that participants played the same
number of hands (i.e., number of trials) in a video poker task regardless of whether or not
the credits had monetary value. In contrast, they also found that these participants tended
to bet a smaller amount if the credits had monetary value. In other words, the number of
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trials was not affected by the monetary value of the token, however the amount bet on
each trial was affected. This result suggests that the frequency of play (number of trials)
is not as affected by monetary value as the amount bet (magnitude) and is an important
finding because there is some research suggesting that problems with reward magnitude
are especially prevalent in individuals with SUD (Thompson et al., 2012). It is important
for future studies to take into account that the actual monetary value of what is being bet
may play a role in how everyone performs on tasks involving betting real or hypothetical
money.
Research has found, in general, that participants are more conservative if
gambling with their own money (Weatherly & Brandt, 2004; Weatherly et al., 2006;
Weather & Meier, 2007). The present results extend these findings to suggest that
individuals with AUS are also more conservative with their own money despite that, in
general, these individuals are willing to take greater risk in high-magnitude conditions
(Thompson et al., 2011). Previous results on gambling paradigms may be an
overestimation of real-world gambling in alcohol users because these participants usually
only receive hypothetical money in the studies. It is important to note that when using
gambling and decision-making tasks in research, performance can be altered depending
on if the participant is making decisions about real money or not. This discrepancy is
also an important factor to take into consideration when using decision-making tools to
assess for difficulties in decision-making. The present results extend this previous
finding to suggest that monetary payment will affect substance users and controls
equally though, so it is probably not an important contributing factor to group differences
seen in decision-making tasks between substance users and controls. Future researchers
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should try to extend these results by running a more powerful study to check and see if
these results truly do hold with the addition of more participants. It will also be useful to
test if these results are similar in other addictive disorders (e.g., gambling disorder,
internet gaming disorder, ect.).
No other results were significant for the slot-machine task. Power was low for all
these analyses, suggesting the possibility of Type II errors. However, the effect sizes are
also small. Overall, this trend suggests that even with enough power to detect the effect,
the difference is not overall that meaningful. These results suggest that a gambling
paradigm (i.e., slot machine) may not be ideal for determining differences between
alcohol users and controls and therefore, this task would not be an ideal tool to use
diagnostically. Based on the data, the number of coins bet per trial appeared to be the
most robust measure on the slot-machine task. Power and effect sizes suggested that this
measure will be the most likely measure to differentiate any possible group or magnitude
effects. However, more empirical data would need to be collected to determine if
gambling could differentiate AUS participants from controls. It could be that the effect
was not noteworthy of detection because this addiction is not that severe of an alcohol
use group. Although individuals reported DSM-5 symptoms of alcohol use, they were
not necessarily diagnosed with any disorders. Results could be different when
investigating more severe alcohol use problems and disorders in which differences could
be more meaningful and easily detected. Researchers would not necessarily expect
differences to be readily observable in a group with relatively minor alcohol use
problems (i.e., not actually needing a diagnosis or treatment at this time).
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Differences on other Decision-Making Tasks
There were no significant group or magnitude differences found on the IGT,
BART, or delay discounting. For all these analyses, power was low, suggesting the
possibility of a Type II error. In addition, the effect sizes were small suggesting that this
is not a meaningful difference even if one were detected. These results are noteworthy
for a couple of reasons. First, all three tasks were poor at differentiating between AUS
participants and controls. Although poor decision-making is commonly observed in
substances users (Bechara et al., 2003), this deficit is not an actual diagnostic criteria for
substance use disorders. In other words, although studying decision-making is important
for substance use disorders, decision-making tasks may not be ideal to differentiate
substance users from controls. In addition, as noted above, it could be that this particular
group of AUS participants is not severe enough to be able to detect meaning differences
in. Although many studies have found group differences on these decision-making tasks,
others have not. It is important for future researchers to discover why these differences
are not always observed. Second, there does not seem to be any significant different
between using hypothetical money and using real money on these tasks. As discussed
previously, some research has found that individuals are more conservative in betting
their own money on gambling tasks (Weatherly & Brandt, 2004; Weatherly et al., 2006;
Weatherly & Meier, 2007). These results do not suggest that this observation is the case
for these decision-making tasks. This finding does help generalize these tasks to real
world decision-making as monetary payment may not change the behavior on these tasks.
However, monetary payment was small on these tasks (e.g, 1 cent for 1 pump on BART).
Real-world decision-making for individuals with SUDs often involves much higher risks
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than a small amount of money (i.e., decisions that involve 1-cent increments). Poor
decisions in this population can result in extreme long-term consequences such as time in
prison, losing their children, or financial hardship. These decision-making tasks may still
be highly underestimating the risk involved in problematic decision-making that is
typically observed in individuals with SUDs. Future research will need to investigate this
more. Despite this limitation, research has demonstrated that the IGT is comparable to
real-world decision-making (Bechara, 2003).

Relationship among Decision-Making Tasks
Overall, these results do not suggest strong overlap between the slot machine,
IGT, BART, and delay discounting. There were no significant correlations among any of
these tasks, suggesting that these tasks are measuring different constructs. In addition, a
cluster analysis revealed that none of the tasks are closely related. The closest observed
relationship was between the slot machine and delay discounting. These tasks may be
more related because they are both less ambiguous paradigms compare to the BART and
IGT. Although the BART and IGT also involve gambling, these tasks are more complex
– often involving choices under ambiguity and risk. In the IGT, the individual does not
know what they are potentially risking before the game starts, and the payout and
punishments remain vague throughout the game. Similarly, in the BART, the individual
does not know when the balloons will pop, and although each press of the balloon gets
riskier over time, it is completely unknown when the balloon will actually pop. This
point is in contrast to the slot machine and delay discounting, which contain information
that removes some ambiguity. In delay discounting, the individual knows the exact time
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of the delay and the individual simply selects how much he/she is willing to give up to
prevent that delay from happening. On the slot machine, an exact payout schedule is
provide to the individual and the individual has control over how much he/she would bet
and when they were going to stop (unlike the IGT where the participant must play exactly
100 trials). It could be that the IGT and BART involve more ambiguity which is why the
slot machine and delay discounting were less related them. Had the cluster analysis
continued, the next cluster would have combined IGT and BART offering further
evidence that these tasks are more similar than delay discounting and the slot machine.
This finding relates to previous research which has shown that individuals with both
gambling and substance use disorders perform more poorly than individuals with just
substance use disorders (Andrade & Petry, 2012). This effect was not seen for BART,
and only seen using delay discounting (Andrade & Petry, 2012) and a computational
model on a modified version of the IGT (in which some ambiguity was removed from the
game; Krmpotich et al., 2015). Together, these results suggest that discounting may hold
more similarity and be more important in gambling that BART or the IGT.
Overall, despite this potential relationship between the slot machine and delay
discounting, the data suggest that all of these tasks are relatively independent including
the three decision-making tasks. It will be important for future research to flesh out
different aspects of decision-making and discover which aspects each of these tasks are
measuring, and how to optimally utilize these tasks both in research and clinically. In
addition, although gambling is involved in the tasks, these results do not suggest that
gambling is a primary component (as these tasks tended to be unrelated to actual
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gambling, i.e., the slot machine). Future research will need to tease apart the exact role
gambling has in these decision-making tasks.

Relationship to Motivation and Reinforcement Contingencies
Previous research has shown that gambling or using drugs to escape a negative
state is far more predictive of severe gambling or substance use problems than gambling
or drinking for a positive state (Baker, 2004). Contrary to the hypothesis, gambling on
the slot machine and performance on the decision-making tasks were not related to using
alcohol or gambling to escape a negative state. The data on the slot machine, IGT and
BART were unable to predict either the coping scale on the DMQR or the negative
reinforcement scale on the AFA. Both of these questionnaires are measures of using
drugs or alcohol as an escape. However, the data on these tasks were able to predict
using alcohol for positive reinforcement in certain states. These results showed that
poorer performance on the decision-making tasks predicted increased endorsement of
using alcohol for social situations and enhancing positive feelings and experiences. In
addition, a trend was found for these tasks predicting conforming to social pressure,
which is a form of external negative reinforcement. Due to low power, this result must
be interpreted with caution and could be a Type I error as it did not meet the alpha
adjusted cutoff. Future research will need to reinvestigate if these tasks can predict
drinking to conform to social pressure.
Decision-making processes may differ under positive and negative states. For
example, Fernández-Serrano et al. (2011) was able to get different results on the IGT by
manipulating the affective state of cocaine addicted individuals before they took the task.
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In general, decision-making tasks are phrased in a very positive way, which could be why
they are relating to more positive constructs (i.e., you have the chance the win money as
opposed to you need to win this task to afford your rent this month). Different results
might be obtained if these tasks were presented in a context where an individual needs to
cope or avoid negative states. Future research will need to investigate if changing the
context behind the decision-making can help create tasks that are more predictive of realworld outcomes. For example, Weatherly, Derenne, and Terrell (2011) found that the
rate of discounting changed depending on whether or not the person had “won” money or
if they were “owed” money. Together, these studies also suggest that the context of the
decision-making task can alter performance and this idea will have to be further explored
in future research. This alteration could also improve the clinical utility of the tasks. It
would be especially helpful for clinicians to able to measure decision-making in a way
that relates to constructs that are involved in problematic substance use behavior as
opposed to motivations that have not been shown to be as problematic.
One reason that research shows conflicting results on these decision-making tasks
may be that these are measures of decision-making in a positive state. These tasks may
be predicting decision-making skills involved in trying to enhance a positive state rather
than avoiding negative affective states (i.e., playing the IGT to feel better after fighting
with a friend). Therefore, these tasks are not necessarily measuring the problematic
decision-making that tends to lead individuals to use alcohol as a coping mechanism or to
avoid feeling negative affective states. Creating and validating tasks that measure this
aspect of decision-making may hold more clinical utility and may be a stronger predictor
of problematic substance use behavior.
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In addition, these results were only found using data from the monetary condition.
If the decision-making tasks were completed only using hypothetical money there was no
positive prediction of drinking alcohol for social situations or enhancing positive feelings
and experiences. This finding may be related to the level of risk. As the situation
becomes more risky (involves real money), researchers may be able to detect the
influences of that decision-making process better investigating decision-making in
situations with little to no risk. It is important to note, that the normal administration of
these tasks was not able to predict any motivation for alcohol use. Finally, gambling on
the slot machine was the most powerful (and in some cases) the only significant
predictor. This result highlights the similarity of gambling and drinking for positive
reinforcement and suggests a strong underlying mechanism between these two disorders.
Finally, these tasks were unable to predict gambling for positive or negative
reinforcement. Future research will need to investigate why there is evidence of a
relationship between gambling motivation and decision-making on gambling paradigms.
It is possible that because this group of individuals reported few, if any gambling
symptoms, that the effect was not meaningful enough to detect.

Limitations
There were several limitations to this study. First, power was low. Higher power
is needed to ascertain which of these effects are empirically supported and which are not.
The data in this study suggested the validity of some of the results, however many of
these results are not strongly supported in this study due to low power. Despite this fact,
several precautions were taken to abet the validity of the results. The use of effect sizes
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helps ascertain which results were plausible given additional power and which ones were
not. Second, only individuals with symptoms of an alcohol use disorder were recruited in
this study. Marked distress or impairment was not assessed for in these participants. In
other words, no formal diagnosis was given to any of these individuals, which weakens
the generalizability to individuals with actual diagnosed alcohol or other substance use
disorders. Despite this weakness, symptoms count is how the DSM-V measures
diagnostic severity in alcohol and other substance use disorders so it worth studying
further. Third, individuals were not excluded based on meeting symptoms for other
substance use disorders. This inclusion criterion can impact the generalizability to
previous research that only investigates pure alcohol use disorders. It becomes difficult
to discern if symptoms of an alcohol use disorder caused these effects or if other drugs
played a role. Despite this limitation, many substance users abuse multiple substances
and substance use and gambling disorders are highly comorbid. Not investigating
alcohol use in isolation may be helpful when trying to address comorbidity problems.
Fourth, our study was too underpowered to look at sex, which has been shown to also
decision-making performance on some tasks (Powell & Ansic, D., 1997; van den Bos et
al., 2013). Future research will need to continue to take into account that individuals with
SUDs tend to perform differently on decision-making task depending on sex. Fifth, the
variance in the data that could have been accounted by participants in the control group
was not removed. This could be problematic if drug use in general affects performance
on decision-making tasks and not just maladaptive addictive behaviors. Future studies
will need to parse this question out. Sixth, cluster analysis is not typically used to group
dependent variables together. In general, in psychological research, factor analysis is
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used for this purpose. Our data did not appear to be appropriate for factor analysis and
although cluster analysis can be an alternative there is potential concern due to the
difficult of this analysis not being related to prior research. In addition, some research
has suggested there may be assumptions and mathematical constricts that have not fully
been investigated when using cluster analysis in this fashion (Anderberg, 2014) which
limits the interpretability of these results. Seventh, investigating if motivation for
alcohol, drug, and gambling use could predict performance on the decision-making tasks
could also be a useful analysis to see how motivation related to decision-making and how
this can influence the process. Future research will need to investigate this topic more.
Finally, the study’s magnitude manipulation was not robust. Although receiving real
monetary compensation is something most studies do not do, the difference between no
money and a few dollars may not be that meaningful.

Strengths
Despite the previously mentioned limitations, there are strengths to this study as
well. First, this study took gambling behaviors into account when looking at decisionmaking tasks. Participants were actively screened out if they had any problematic
gambling behavior. This exclusion criterion is important when trying to flesh out the
similarities and differences between substance use and gambling disorders. Researchers
need to be very clear which of these behaviors are and not problematic for the
participants. Second, this study investigated how gambling may be similar or different to
decision-making paradigms. Because many decision-making tasks involve gambling and
are based on gambling paradigms it is important to investigate the role of gambling in
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decision-making. Third, this study investigated some of the relationships between
gambling and substance use behaviors. This relationship is important for future research
as these disorders are so highly comorbid and are both considered addictive behaviors
(American Psychological Association, 2013). Fourth, this study investigated how similar
decision-making task are to actual gambling paradigms. These results showed that there
is not a lot of overlap with all of these decision-making tasks suggesting that there is a lot
of utility to using different decision-making tasks. In addition, a gambling paradigm was
the strongest potential predictor of group and magnitude differences in the study and the
most powerful predictor of using alcohol as a social, conforming, and enhancement
motivation. Fifth, this study took monetary rewards into account. Most research
involving decision-making tasks involves using hypothetical money, which can decrease
the ecological validity of these studies overall. These results suggested that, in terms of
finding group difference between controls and AUS participants, monetary payment is
not an important factor. However, receiving actual monetary payment did have a direct
influence if the decision-making tasks were able to predict using alcohol for positive
reinforcement, suggesting that monetary compensation is an important consideration
when developing future studies. Finally, this study was able to help address the clinical
utility of decision-making tasks by relating these tasks to both functional assessment and
assessments of alcohol motivation. Functional and motivational assessments (i.e., AFA,
GFA-R, & DMQR) are useful both as a research tool and therapeutically. These
instruments provide insight into whether individuals are using substances or gambling to
avoid negative affective states, and if so could suggest that these individuals are at higher
risk for more symptoms of addiction. These assessments can also help identify
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behavioral contingencies that are noteworthy for intervention. Contingency based
therapies have been shown to especially help for substance use disorders (Carroll &
Onken, 2014; Dutra et al., 2008; Lussier et al., 2006; Prendergast et al, 2006).

Conclusion
There were four main findings in this study. First, all participants tended to bet
more tokens per trial on the slot machine when there was no monetary compensation
compared to if there was. Second, no group or magnitude differences were found on any
of the decision-making tasks (i.e., IGT, BART, and delay discounting). Effect size and
power suggested that this result was not a type 2 error and that there does not seem to be
any group or magnitude differences on these tasks in this population. Third, the slot
machine and all the decision-making task seems to be relatively independent from each
other. These tasks seem to measure different aspect of decision-making and,
surprisingly, do not have a lot of overlap in explaining variance in the data or similar
participant performance. Fourth, performance on the slot machine and the decisionmaking tasks was able to predict using alcohol for positive reinforcement, in particular,
for social situations and enhancing positive feelings and experiences.
It is important that future research investigates decision making 1) uses multiple
measures of decision making to access potentially different aspect of decision-making
and 2) flesh out the differences between these tasks and find out what these tasks are able
to detect. Currently the IGT is considered a clinical measure of decision-making so it
will be important for future research to detect exactly what aspects of decision-making
this test assesses for and what problems it may be able to detect. Because research is spilt
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on if this task can consistently find differences between substance users and controls this
is a very important issue. Our results suggests that these tasks may be better at detecting
decision-making in regard to positive reinforcement, that is drinking socially, and
drinking to enhance pleasurable experiences. These constructs are not as related to
problematic substance use as much as using drugs or alcohol for coping or for escaping
negative states. Other decision-making task may need to be used or developed that tap
into decision-making in this mental state to better assess for more clinically relevant
decision-making difficulties. This could help improve the clinical utility of decision
making measures and may offer more consistent results in studies in the future that look
at decision-making in substance use disorders.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A.
MONETARY CONDITION
You are about to be given a chance to play a slot machine, the same as those found
in actual casinos. You have been staked with 50 credits to bet. Each credit is worth
$0.05. In other words, if you choose to play, you have $2.50 to gamble. At the end of
the session, you will be paid in cash for the total number of credits you have
accumulated or have remaining. It should be your goal to end the session with as
many credits as you can. How you accomplish that is up to you. You can bet
anywhere from 1 to 3 credits per play and you may quit playing at any time. The
session will end when (a) you decide to quit, (b) 10 minutes have elapsed, or (c) you
reach 0 credits. Be sure to cash out after each win. Do you have any questions?

NO MONEY CONDITION
You are about to be given a chance to play a slot machine, the same as those found
in actual casinos. You have been staked with 50 credits to bet. Each credit is worth
$0.05. In other words, if you choose to play, you have $2.50 to gamble. It should be
your goal to end the session with as many credits as you can. How you accomplish
that is up to you. You can bet anywhere from 1 to 3 credits per play and you may
quit playing at any time. The session will end when (a) you decide to quit, (b) 10
minutes have elapsed, or (c) you reach 0 credits. Be sure to cash out after each win.
Do you have any questions?
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Appendix B.
ALCOHOL USE FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT
Using this 7-point scale, please circle the number that best represents the extent to which
each statement applies to your alcohol use.
1
7
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree

2

3

4

5

Neutral

1. I take alcohol when I feel anxious.
2. I take alcohol to feel confident.
3. I take alcohol to feel good about myself.
4. I take alcohol when I feel sad.
5. I take alcohol to feel joyful.
6. I take alcohol to enjoy social activities more.
7. I take alcohol when I am faced with difficult tasks.
8. I take alcohol to feel more alive.
9. I take alcohol to fit in with others.
10. I take alcohol when I feel bad about myself.
11. I take alcohol when I feel afraid or scared.
12. I take alcohol to feel euphoric.
13. I take alcohol when I feel upset.
14. I take alcohol when I feel guilty or remorseful.
15. I take alcohol when I feel angry.
16. I take alcohol to feel positive.
17. I take alcohol when I feel nervous.
18. I take alcohol when I am having problems with friends.
19. I take alcohol when I am having problems.
20. I take alcohol when I feel tense
21. I take alcohol when I am with friends who are also drinking.
22. I take alcohol to get a “high”.
23. I take alcohol to feel a rush or feeling excitement.
24. I take alcohol when I am having problems with my relationships.
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Table 1. Demographic and Questionnaire Data
Controls
M
SD
Demographics
Sex
Age
GPA

AUS
M

SD

Significance
p

1.92
0.60

0.53
0.32
0.03

6M/17F
19.35
3.48*

2.37
0.35

6M/11F
20.06
3.08

Addiction
AUS
SUS
SOGS

0
0
0.30

0
0
0.56

3.29
4.18
0.65

1.65
2.83
1.06

< 0.001
< 0.001
0.19

AFA
Positive
Negative

17.04
13.48

12.05
1.88

46.06
33.06

23.64
31.30

< 0.001
0.02

GFA-R
Positive
Negative

17.52
11.18

10.91
9.74

25.53
5.13

14.42
6.32

0.05
0.43

DMQR
SOC
COP
ENH

4.82
2.64
2.32

4.50
4.22
3.86

18.47
11.23
15.64

9.35
6.09
6.78

< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001

CON

6.00

2.78

10.59

5.42

< 0.01

*Only 20 out the 24 controls reported their GPA
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix
Slot Machine

IGT
-0.32

BART
0.00
-0.04

IGT
-0.32

BART
0.00
-0.04

DD Money
0.25
0.08
-0.10

IGT
90.54

BART
74.73
71.51

Slot Machine
IGT
BART
DD Money

Slot Machine
IGT
BART

DD Money
0.25
0.08
-0.10

Table 3. Proximity Matrix
Slot Machine
Slot Machine
IGT
BART
DD Money
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DD Money
54.12
66.01
78.71

Figure 1. Performance on the slot machine and decision-making tasks.
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Figure 2. Delay discounting data where the controls are in grey and AUS are in black.
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Figure 3.The Icicle Plot is a visualization of the conglomeration schedule. Each of the
four tasks has a column marked at the top of the figure (slot machine, IGT, BART, &
delay discounting). There are columns between each task to represent linkage. A vertical
bar descends from each of the columns that mark the four tasks to the bottom of the
graph. The first two tasks that are linked together (slot machine & delay discounting has
a bar between them that descends the furthest of the remaining columns. This shows that
these are the first two clusters that merge with each other. The next set of clusters that
join (BART and IGT) have a bar that descends halfway down the graph. This shows that
these are next two clusters to merge. Finally, the last two clusters (AUC and Slot with
IGT and BART) has no bar descending between the columns. In other words, the further
the bar descends between two task columns means, the more similar those tasks are to
each other.
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Figure 4. The dendrogram is another way to visualize how the clusters merge together.
On the Y axis. There are four rows that represent the four tasks. On the X axis is the
relative distance in space between the clusters when they merge. The further away from
the left side of the graph means the tasks are more similar. The graph is read from left to
right with each new cluster being linked. Further distances mean those clusters where
further apart when they were ultimately linked together.
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